By means of a split-ballot survey experiment, we study whether a normative instruction not to use the Internet when answering political knowledge questions reduces cheating in web surveys. The knowledge questions refer to basic facts about the European Union and the data come from the Italian National Election Study web panel carried out in Italy before the 2014 European Election. Our analysis shows that a simple normative instruction significantly reduces cheating. We also show that reducing cheating is important to achieve a correct assessment of reliability of knowledge scales, while a decrease of cheating leaves unaltered the knowledge gap between lower and higher educated respondents. These results invite caution when including political knowledge questions in an online survey. Our advice is to include a normative instruction not to search the Internet to reduce cheating and obtain more genuine answers. More generally, we conclude by stressing the need to consider the implications of online data collection when building questionnaires for public opinion research.
By means of a split-ballot survey experiment, we study whether a normative instruction not to use the Internet when answering political knowledge questions reduces cheating in web surveys. The knowledge questions refer to basic facts about the European Union and the data come from the Italian National Election Study web panel carried out in Italy before the 2014 European Election. Our analysis shows that a simple normative instruction significantly reduces cheating. We also show that reducing cheating is important to achieve a correct assessment of reliability of knowledge scales, while a decrease of cheating leaves unaltered the knowledge gap between lower and higher educated respondents. These results invite caution when including political knowledge questions in an online survey. Our advice is to include a normative instruction not to search the Internet to reduce cheating and obtain more genuine answers. More generally, we conclude by stressing the need to consider the implications of online data collection when building questionnaires for public opinion research. The rise of web surveys has raised concerns of potential non-random biases related to the measurement of political knowledge. In particular, attention has been paid to a phenomenon labelled as "cheating in web surveys" (Jensen and Thomsen 2014) , when web survey respondents give a correct answer after having searched the Internet for it.
Thanks to search engines like Google, respondents can in fact find the right answer to a knowledge question in just a few seconds. In light of these considerations, researchers have started to explore strategies to overcome the problem of on-line cheating. The solutions proposed have been various in nature, with some researchers simply suggesting to ask respondents not to look up the answers on the Internet. Following this hint, our study analyses the effect of the introduction of a normative prompt dissuading web searches when answering political knowledge questions by means of a split-ballot web survey experiment.
In this study, we follow this hint, controlling the efficacy of a normative prompt dissuading web searches to reduce cheating when answering political knowledge questions. We do so by running a survey experiment manipulating the introduction to a battery of knowledge questions on basic facts about the European Union (EU). After an introduction on political knowledge questions in web surveys, we describe the experimental design. We then present data, measures and methods, we illustrate the results and we close the article with a discussion on the implications of our findings for 
Political knowledge questions in web surveys
Political knowledge is commonly defined as "a measure of a citizen's ability to provide correct answers to a specific set of fact-based questions" (Boudreau and Lupia 2011, 171) . Thus, political knowledge refers to the individual level of factual knowledge on political issues. Political knowledge is crucial in the study of political behavior and public opinion, as Jensen and Thomsen (2014) variable. Generally, political knowledge is not regarded as a concept per se, but is used as an indicator of political sophistication (Luskin 1987 ) and the related concepts of political expertise, awareness and involvement (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993) .
Batteries of factual items are the most employed tool to measure the concept, although some studies underline how little individual motivation there is to answer those kinds of question correctly, with the associated risk of underestimating respondents' political knowledge (Prior and Lupia 2008) . Further difficulties to address knowledge questions have emerged with the increased use of web surveys in public opinion research 1 . The well-known advantages of this data collection mode (Callegaro, Lozar Manfreda and Vehovar 2015, 18-25) come with a cost, especially in terms of control over the interview environment. This shortcoming of online questionnaires is particularly relevant in the case of questions that require an answer that can be found on the Internet.
Previous research has empirically tested the cheating behavior of respondents in web surveys. In an experimental study which randomly allocates individuals either to a computer lab or to an online administration of the same questionnaire, Clifford and Jerit (2014) find that the rate of right answers to political knowledge items is significantly higher in the online condition, suggesting the presence of cheating when control over the respondent decreases. Similarly, Jensen and Thomsen find that a substantial 22% of the respondents to a web survey admit to having used the Internet to answer questions on political knowledge 2 .
As to the strategies to overcome the problem of on-line cheating, Vavreck (2012) states that the main issue to be addressed is the low level of environmental control when 1 In the above mentioned literature review, Jensen and Thomsen report that 23% of the studies examined are web-based.
2 The text of the question is the following: "The Internet has made it much easier for ordinary people to get access to information about important questions. Many use the Internet on a regular basis. Therefore, we would like to know if you used the Internet when answering one or more of the previous four questions?" (Jensen and Thomsen 2014, 3348) . suggests testing the presence of cheating by downloading the browser histories of respondents. On one side, this strategy represents an effective way to detect cheaters but, on the other side, it is difficult to implement and does not work as an antidote to deceptive behavior. Other scholars recommend introducing a time limit when answering political knowledge questions (Iyengar et al. 2010; Strabac and Aalberg 2011) .
Although partially successful, that strategy cannot prevent cheating, considering that in most cases online search for correct answers takes fewer seconds than any reasonable time limit could hope to prevent (Jensen and Thomsen 2014) . Recently, Munzert and Selb (2015) have tested the use of visual questions as an antidote against cheating.
Nonetheless, their findings do not prove the efficacy of visual instruments in reducing cheating.
In the face of such difficulties, Shulman and Boster (2014, 187) propose simpler and more straightforward advice: that some "suggestions to discourage online cheating
[should] include adding information not to look up answers online". The strength of such a recommendation finds its foundation in the idea that an individual will behave consistently with the implicit commitment taken when exposed to the normative message, reducing potentially problematic behavior (Cialdini 1984, 51-57; Schultz et al. 2007) . Following this suggestion, by means of a split-ballot web survey experiment our 
Experimental design and hypotheses
The respondents to a web survey (N = 3,243) are assigned either to a treatment group or to a control group through a simple randomization. The experiment manipulates the preamble to a battery of three political knowledge items. Next to a neutral introduction to the political knowledge questions, the treated group receives a normative instruction that invites respondents not to search the Internet for the correct answers. The text of the two parts is as follows:
Neutral introduction: Finally, we will propose some questions on political knowledge.
Normative instruction:
We ask you to answer without searching the Internet.
The precise formulations of the experimental conditions are as follows:
The first aim of the experiment is to test whether such a simple normative instruction is successful in reducing cheating behavior. We thus expect that in the treatment group the proportion of correct answers to the knowledge questions is lower, Secondly, we control the impact of cheating on the reliability and validity of an additive knowledge scale. Although a good measurement should be both reliable and valid (Carmines and Zeller 1979), we hypothesize a paradoxical outcome with increasing reliability coupled with a degradation of validity when cheating is more widespread (control group). In fact, more cheating produces a higher proportion of respondents with full scores (all correct answers) which artificially inflates inter-item correlations between the knowledge items. However, for cheaters, those high scores do not indicate higher knowledge, jeopardizing the validity of the scale.
Finally, we look at whether cheating alters the relation between knowledge and socio-demographic dimensions, focusing on education. Previous research based on selfreported cheating found that lower educated respondents show a higher probability (of reporting) of having searched the Internet to answer knowledge questions in web surveys (Jensen and Thomsen 2014) . Consequently, it has been argued that in web surveys the educational gap in political knowledge could be underestimated, as lower educated respondents compensate for their lack of knowledge by booting up the Internet. Our expectation is therefore that the distance in knowledge performance between educational groups is larger (and more genuine) in the treatment condition, where cheating is reduced by the effect of the normative prompt. The sample is made of 3,243 individuals, selected from an opt-in community group of a private research company (SWG). It is a non-probabilistic sample aiming to reproduce the quotas for gender, age and territorial distribution of the Italian population.
Data, measures and methods

Data
Although the sample non-representativeness can be an issue when aiming at producing inferences to the general population, in this paper we focus on a specific cognitive mechanism and we overcome the sample weaknesses by a randomized experimental design.
The questionnaire includes a three-item battery on knowledge of European Union (political) matters, as in De Vreese and Boomgarden (2006) . The reason to test EU knowledge rather than general (or national) political knowledge is connected to the Schulz)
The three items differ both in answer mode and content (Barabas et al. 2014) . As far as content is concerned, while item A tests general knowledge, also defined as textbook knowledge (Jennings 1996) , items B and C address surveillance knowledge, relative to current events. Looking at the answer mode, the question on the number of countries belonging to EU (item A) is open-ended with a short numeric answer, while the other two questions (item B and C) are multiple choice. This implies that respondents have higher chances of guessing the correct answer for those items (Shulman and Boster 2014) . The option "don't know" was allowed only for item A (filling "9999", as indicated in the text of the question). For item B and C, respondents were forced to give an answer and "don't know" was not allowed (Mondak and Davis 2001) 3 .
In the coming analysis, EU political knowledge is measured considering the answers to each item separately and by an additive scale reporting for each respondent the sum of correct answers to the three knowledge questions.
The effect of treatment will be tested through the comparison of the aggregate proportions of correct answers in the two experimental groups.
In the assessment of the impact of cheating on the quality of the knowledge scale measure we will perform reliability analysis and we will consider construct validity.
As for reliability, Pearson's correlations 4 among the three knowledge items and their internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) will be calculated for the two groups. If cheating biases the performance in a non-random way, thereby increasing the chances of giving correct answers to all the items, we expect that pairwise correlations and Cronbach's alpha will be higher in the control group.
As for construct validity 5 , we will compute Pearson's correlations between the knowledge scale and two theoretically related variables (Atkin, Galloway and Nayman 3 Full description of the items and distributions are available in the online Appendix. 4 In 2x2 tables, the Pearson's correlation coefficient coincides with the phi coefficient for two binary variables.
5 Construct validity is defined as "the extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured" (Carmines and Zeller 1979, 23) . 
Results
Comparing the proportion of correct answers in the two experimental groups, it turns out that the performance on knowledge items is significantly lower in the treatment group. Assuming that neither treatment decreases knowledge nor its absence increases it, the difference between the two groups could be fully attributed to the deterrent effect against cheating of the normative prompt. Table 1 shows that this holds for all the items (p-values < 0.01) 6 . Thus, the simple strategy of adding a normative 6 Regardless of the experimental condition the three knowledge questions meet the criterion introduced by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993, 1187) , who suggest avoiding items either too easy (correct answers > 90%) or too difficult (correct answers < 10%). Considering the different items, the open-ended question produces larger differences between the two experimental groups (10 percentage points, against 6 and 7 percentage points respectively for the items B and C). However, it is difficult to say whether this difference should be attributed either to the answer mode or to the difficulty of the item, being A also the most difficult item 7 .
[ Table 1 about here]
The last row of Table 1 shows the proportions of respondents who answered correctly to all the three questions on EU political knowledge. Again the difference between the two experimental groups is highly significant (p-value < 0.01) and in the expected direction. This outcome brings us directly to the next step of our analysis that is the evaluation of the impact of cheating on the quality of the knowledge measurement.
A complete distribution of the answers to the three knowledge questions, including the distribution of wrong answers, is supplied in Appendix A1 and A2. 7 An experimental study considering knowledge questions with different levels of complexity did not find an association between cheating activities and difficulties of the items (Clifford and Jerit 2016). As stated in the previous section, cheating can affect correlations between the different knowledge items and consequently influence the reliability of the scale built using those items. Our findings are in line with these expectations. Pairwise correlations between knowledge items are always higher in the control group (see Table 2 ), although the difference is not statistically significant for the item combination B -C. The same applies for the internal consistency of the knowledge scale (Cronbach's alpha, last row of Table 2 ). These findings bring us to an immediate consideration: when a battery of political knowledge items is included in a web survey, the reliability analysis can lead to misleading conclusions about the quality of measurement, since cheating behaviors artificially increase the internal consistency of the scale.
[ Table 2 about here]
The degradation of the validity of the measurement when cheating is more diffuse should represent the other side of the coin. However, the results in terms of construct validity are not as clear as the ones on reliability. Although political knowledge is significantly correlated in the expected theoretical direction with the two indicators used to test construct validity (interest in the election outcome and frequency of political discussion), differences between the two experimental groups are not significant ( A3 in the Appendix). Therefore, there is no empirical evidence supporting the idea of a decreasing validity when cheating is more widespread.
The last step of our analysis concerns the study of the impact of cheating on the relation between knowledge and education. To do so, we put our knowledge scale within a regression framework where education is interacted with the experimental condition (reference category = control group) 8 , controlling for gender and age.
If cheating is more widespread among lower educated people, cheating could compensate for lack of knowledge in that group and accordingly reduce the effect of education on the additive knowledge scale. Conversely, a reduction in cheating (which actually happens in the treatment condition) should lead to an increase in the knowledge gap between education groups. If this is the case, we should find a positive interaction effect between education and treatment and increased distances in the knowledge scores for the different educational groups in the treatment condition.
No empirical evidence supporting these expectations emerges from the analysis.
Although the main effects for education, as well as for the other socio-demographic variables, go in the expected direction (more education enhances knowledge, men know more than women, and older people know more than the younger), the interaction terms are not significantly different from zero, indicating that the effect of education does not 8 A similar regression approach has been proposed for the study of social desirability in the framework of list experiments, where it is not known how each respondent reacts to a sensitive item presented in a longer list of control items. See for example Janus (2010) . [ Figure 1 about here]
Discussion and conclusions
Measuring factual (political) knowledge in web surveys is a difficult business, as respondents who do not know the correct answer to a question can easily find it by searching the Internet. What is defined as "cheating in web-surveys" (Jensen and Thomsen 2014) is therefore harmful for our knowledge measurement, potentially affected by non-random biases.
Our study explored the effectiveness of introducing simple normative instructions to reduce cheating in web surveys. We did so by implementing a split-ballot experiment on a sample of Italian citizens coming from a web-based electoral survey carried out before the EP election 2014 (N > 3,000). While the interviewees belonging to the -cheating in web surveys is a widespread phenomenon;
-simple normative instructions work effectively to reduce cheating.
Prevention of cheating is relevant given that such behaviour affects the properties of our measures, potentially resulting in misleading evaluations. We indeed found that the correlations between knowledge items as well as the reliability of the additive knowledge scale artificially increases when cheating is more diffuse. We did not find any evidence, otherwise, of a degradation of the validity of our measure due to cheating.
The reason for this negative finding can be linked to the fact that the battery of items used in the experiment is not as well-established nor widely tested as the one recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) . For more compelling results, then, Finally, we did not find support for the hypothesis that suggests that cheating is more diffuse among lower educated respondents and consequently that cheating enhances their performances, closing the gap with more educated respondents (Jensen and Thomsen 2014) . This outcome is coherent with a reading that suggests, on one hand, that cheating is a crosscutting phenomenon, whilst, on the other, that the effectiveness of normative instructions not to cheat is seemingly effective on all educational groups. Our results signal that previous findings showing a higher prevalence of cheating among lower educated respondents could be an artefact produced by the use of self-reported measures of cheating. In fact, higher educated people could be more vulnerable to social desirability and thus report cheating less often.
Of course, our analyses are not without shortcomings. The main limitation of our study is connected to the fact that we do not have individual level measures on the actual presence of the cheating behaviour. Our conclusions are therefore drawn at the aggregate level and the reduction of cheating due to the normative instruction is deduced by the comparison of the average performances on knowledge questions in the control and treatment group. The actual amount of cheating remains unknown as well as whether a person has cheated or not. This does not jeopardize our conclusion on the Moreover, any disputes over compliance with normative instructions and the effects of social desirability cannot be conclusively settled with our data since a valid indicator of cheating at the individual level is not available. Further research will be necessary to deepen these aspects. Finally, it is important to remember that our conclusions come from an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis and it is not possible to be sure that respondents actually read and considered the normative instruction (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014) .
To overcome some of these weaknesses, a suggestion could be to couple split ballot experiments like ours with the administration in the same interview of a question on self-reported cheating to triangulate the results (Clifford and Jerit 2016). A further articulation of this advice could go in the direction of asking about cheating behavior not directly but by means of a list experiment (Blair and Imai 2012) to be able to better estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon and to assess the effect of social desirability on the reports. Following the guideline suggested by Munzert and Selb (2015) , the measurement of the response latencies (that is the time used to answer a question) could represent another strategy to detect cheating, allowing for a more precise assessment of the impact of the normative instruction. All things considered, we still maintain that the main result of our study is robust: a normative instruction not to search the Internet for help with answering knowledge questions is an effective tool to reduce cheating in web surveys. Thus, the advice when administering knowledge questions in web surveys is always to use a cheap and nonintrusive tool, such as this, in order to obtain more genuine results.
What we have shown in this article pertains to a specific kind of question meant to measure the knowledge of respondents. The peculiarity of these questions is that they usually only have one correct answer, either to be guessed (open ended) or chosen between a list of options (multiple choice). In the case of web surveys, where the control of the researcher over the interviewee is absent, these questions are particularly vulnerable to cheating behaviour. Nonetheless, the modality in which data are collected does not only affect knowledge questions. Each measure conceived to tap into a certain concept and included in an online questionnaire should be adapted to that data collection mode, considering that a self-administered online questionnaire largely differs from a face-to-face or telephone interview. Thus, the results invite us to pay further attention to this issue, promoting a broader use of survey experiments to enhance our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms at work beneath the activity of answering structured questionnaires (Sirken et al. 1999 ). This could help in the process of calibration and standardization of measurement instruments in public opinion research, improving both their reliability and validity. 
Note on Replication Material
The dataset is an extract of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) $ Differences between correlation coefficients tested using Fisher r-to-Z transformation. # Differences between two Cronbach alpha's tested using the Feldt test (Feldt 1969 
